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Frazier v. Harper' continues the supreme court trend of making
pension benefits an important element of the community's shared assets.
In Frazier, the ex-husband's employee pension rights remained co-owned
by him and his former wife.2 That plan was then replaced by the
employer with a new (ERISA qualified3) plan. The court of appeal
concluded that the co-owned asset ceased to exist, with both spouses
losing their interests in that lost asset. It concluded further that the
wife had no interest in the new plan formed after their divorce because
she was not married to the employee at that time. This conclusion was
reached even though the new plan gave the husband credit for the years
of employment during his earlier marriage.4
A unanimous supreme court reversed and held the wife had an
interest in the new plan.' The court reasoned that the old pension rights
were converted into new ones and that the wife acquired an undivided
interest in the new plan under a novation theory.6 The former spouses
Copyright 1993, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Wex. S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992).
2. Under the formula of Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978). See Katherine
S. Spaht and W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 3.28, at 94, in 16 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1989).
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). See
Elizabeth Alford Beskin, Comment, Retirement Equity Inaction: Division of Pension
Benefits Upon Divorce in Louisiana, 48 La. L. Rev. 677 (1988).
4. The court of appeal characterized the issue as one of classification "when the
plan itself was initiated after the community was terminated but some of the employee's
years of service during the community counted toward his entitlement to retirement
benefits." Frazier v. Harper, 582 So. 2d 868, 870 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 600
So. 2d 59 (1992).
5. Frazier, 600 So. 2d at 59. Under the Sims formula, "the court divided the interests
in the pension according to time: the period of time the employee was married divided
by the total time contributed would determine the community portion of the interest."
Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, at 94.
6. "Novation is the extinguishment of an existing obligation by the substitution of
a new one." La. Civ. Code art. 1879.
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were co-owners of the pension rights and both of them, under the
court's approach to the law of novation, would normally have to consent
to the novation for it to be effective. The wife's consent was not clear
from the record, but the court concluded that if the change in the plan
was not actually within the husband's authority to act alone, the wife
ratified the transaction "by commencing and prosecuting this lawsuit
' 7
and could benefit from the novation.
The equities of the decision are apparent, although the reliance on
a ratification theory is problematical. Ratification occurs when a person
consents to an obligation incurred on his behalf by another.' It is not
at all clear that the husband was acting on his co-owner's behalf, 9 and
in future cases the covered employee could prevent the ratification theory
from being used by clearly contracting only on his own authority and
not on the other's behalf.
The court did offer additional reasons for its conclusion, citing
Aubry and RauI° to support a "de facto agency" concept and the
Louisiana Civil Code negotiorum gestio concept." The latter two theories
are preferable because they do not depend on the consent of both parties
to produce the result.
A more direct analysis, however, is available to support the court's
basic real subrogation approach. Indeed, part of the problem in this
area of the law is that of conceptualizing it in terms of co-ownership.
Co-ownership rules were developed in light of and apply clearly to
things, but not to rights such as the claim against a pension fund
administrator. Under normal rules, things are substituted for other things
under real subrogation concepts, and rights are replaced by other rights
under novation concepts. However, the Louisiana Civil Code has adopted
the notion of ownership of incorporeals and governs what it calls their
co-ownership. Fortunately, however, in doing this, the Code provides
some flexibility, which justifies the decision in the case.
The key article is Louisiana Civil Code article 818, which applies
the laws governing co-ownership to rights only "to the extent compatible
with the nature of those rights," allowing some deviation from the strict
7. Frazier, 600 So. 2d at 62. A loose construction of the ratification concept was
also used in Garrett v. Walker, 407 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (husband's
filing suit for ownership of half the property bought by wife without his knowledge was
a ratification of the wife's mortgaging the property to secure repayment of the funds
borrowed to purchase the property).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1843.
9. Confirmation under La. Civ. Code art. 1842 is also not applicable because the
obligation-the novation-would not be a relatively null one.
10. Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Property § 331, at 387-88, in 2 Droit Civil Francais
(Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 7th ed. 1961).
11. La. Civ. Code art. 2295. Alain A. Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Unjust Enrichment
in Quasi-Contracts, Louisiana Civil Code Series, at 74 (1991).
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laws of co-ownership that are designed to govern things. When the rights
involved are claims to performance by third persons under a contract,
protection of the third person's interests from conflicting demands of
co-owners would require that only the party in privity be able to manage
or alienate the contractual right.' 2 Under this analysis, the consent of
the ex-wife in Frazier was unnecessary. The husband could exchange
the pension plan for another acting on his own authority, and real
subrogation would occur to make the new right co-owned according to
the community and separate interests in the old plan.
This approach is not inconsistent with the novation concept, which
is in effect real subrogation under another name. Louisiana Civil Code
article 1879 does not require that a novation be contractual. Comment
(a) to Article 1879 states, "It changes the law only insofar as it does
not define novation as a contract. Indeed, novation is not in itself a
transaction but the legal effect of certain acts. Novation may even result
by operation of law." In other words, by operation of law, real sub-
rogation of the co-owned right occurs. Putting it another way, a novation
occurs when the new obligation replaces the old one. In any event, the
replacement occurs by the consent of the parties in privity, and the
consent of the other party is not necessary.
In terms of basic policies, this result accommodates the interests of
the ex-spouses and the third party. The approach would seem to be
necessary here when only one of the co-owners has management rights
with respect to the co-owned intangible asset. It is analogous to the
situation during the community regime when only one spouse has man-
agement rights to a community asset consisting of a claim against a
third person.'
Still to be decided is the case of a pension plan instituted after
divorce which gives service credit for work by an ex-spouse during a
prior community regime. The fourth circuit court of appeal in Taylor
v. Taylor'4 concluded that such retirement benefits would be prorated,-
with the ex-wife having an interest based on the years of service during
the community. It relied primarily on basic equitable sharing policies
reflected in Sims v. Sims 5 and T. L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery6
and on the theory that the benefit is one attributable to effort by spouses
during the community. In an earlier case, applying its understanding of
then existing Louisiana law, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
12. Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, § 5.4, at 154.
13. Id. Janis Lynn Kile, Comment, Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal
Movables, 42 La. L. Rev. 770, 774 (1982); La. Civ. Code art. 2346, comment (b).
14. 473 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 477 So. 2d 1126 (1985).
15. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
16. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
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in United Association of Journeymen v. Myers 7 held otherwise, relying
primarily on the approach that no partitionable property right existed
at the time of the divorce.
The basic problem is the tension between an underlying equitable
sharing policy, and the rules of community property, which govern
ownership of things, rights, or assets that have an existence during the
community. The concept of the types of "property" or "rights" that
are shared has been expanded in modern times, but still, some kind of
thing must exist. 8 Here, the "thing" or "right" would have to be the
expectancy of a future retirement plan being adopted by an employer,
a plan that would give credit for work performed during the community.
It is a step beyond Due,'9 where contracts existed, or Michel,20 where
written drafts or outlines of books existed. It may be more akin to the
personal attributes or knowledge that follow an education, or akin to
professional good will, none of which have been recognized in Louisiana
as community assets. 21
In more practical terms, the problem also involves the policy question
of whether ex-spouses should be forced to continue as co-owners, as
opposed to their divorce being a clean break from which they both can
reorder their lives without further litigation or disputes. Forced ownership
in indivision of pension rights, adopted in Sims 2 as an equitable ne-
cessity, is a concept from which the supreme court has withdrawn in
Hare v. Hodgins3 in favor of a more flexible handling of such rights.
Especially if one or both of the spouses were to remarry, the expectations
of the new spouses would also be at stake. The method of partitioning
such unknown (perhaps unknowable) assets at the time of the divorce,
when those assets ought best be divided, is also a serious problem.
II. FRUITS OR EARNINGS OR BOTH?
In its initial decision in Kyson v. Kyson,24 the second circuit court
of appeal classified rental income from the husband's separate property
pro rata. It determined that part of the income was a fruit (and thus
separate property 2 ) and that part was income from effort, skill, or
17. 645 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981).
18. Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, § 2.1, at 25.
19. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
20. Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
21. Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, §§ 2.5, 2.6, at 32-39.
22. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
23. 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 1991). See Lee Hargrave, Developments in the Law-
Matrimonial Regimes, 52 La. L. Rev. 655, 664 (1992).
24. 596 So. 2d 1308 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 314 (1992).
25. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
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industry (and thus community property2 6). On rehearing, it reversed on
the basis that the facts did not support its initial conclusion. Presumably
the case remains as some authority for prorating rental income that
results both from a spouse's labor and from a return on a separate
property investment.
In Kyson, the husband had filed a declaration to keep the fruits
of his separate property as separate assets, which ostensibly would make,
as the trial judge held, the rental income all his separate property.27
The wife had argued that the income should be entirely community as
the product of his effort, skill, and industry,2" based on the husband's
testimony that his occupation was a rental manager of his properties.
The court of appeal took a middle view, concluding that some of the
income should be considered compensation for his labor in finding
renters, making repairs and otherwise tending to his rental property,
but that some of it should be considered a return on his separate property
investment and a fruit to that extent. It remanded for determination of
the appropriate pro rata division.
On rehearing before five judges, the court focused on the factual
issues and concluded, "We are unable to discern from the record suf-
ficient quantification of Mr. Kyson's time and labor associated with the
disputed rental income from which we can draw any meaningful con-
clusion. The trial court made no factual finding in this regard." ' 29 It
then concluded that all the rental income was separate and stated that
the husband's "personal management efforts toward these four properties
during the marriage cannot be viewed on this record as so extraordinary
as to result in his abdication of the rentals he expressly reserved unto
himself." 30 The supreme court denied writs.3"
Interestingly, the court did not consider the presumption of com-
munity. a2 Since the husband possessed the money during the existence
of the community regime, the funds are presumed to be community
property. Had the court pursued that analysis, it would then have put
the burden on the husband to prove the separate property classification.
In the case of the normal passive investment, proving the source of the
income (i.e., that the money is a fruit) after the filing of a declaration
would be enough to overcome the presumption. However, if the issue
is the nature of the funds (i.e., whether the money is a fruit or earnings),
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
29. Kyson v. Kyson, 596 So. 2d 1308, 1315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied,
599 So. 2d 314 (1992).
30. Id. at 1316.
31. Kyson, 599 So. 2d 314.
32. La. Civ. Code art. 2340.
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the person asserting that the income is separate should have the burden
of proof. In any event, that issue of the burden of proof was not
clearly addressed in Kyson and remains an open matter.
More to the point, however, is the continuing validity of the court's
approach on original hearing. Paxton v. Bramlette,3  in light of the
authorities it cites, can be used to support proration of the rental income
between the two patrimonies.14 Paxton, however, can also be seen as
supporting classification of all the rental income based on the majority
component. 3 Indeed, the result in Paxton was to classify all the wife's
payments from a corporation as community property because it was
salary, or reward for her effort, skill, or industry. However, proration
had not been urged as an alternative in the case.
At one time, the all or nothing approach to classifying such funds
may have been preferable. Until 1980, the husband could not reserve
the fruits of separate property to his separate estate.16 His energies,
whether producing wages or producing fruits from separate or community
assets, would produce community income. Only the wife could choose
to make the fruits of her separate property separate, and at one point
in the past, only if she reserved to herself the administration of that
property. The implication was that if she performed works of admin-
istration that produced fruits from her property, the whole profit was
a fruit. The court of appeal suggested as much in Hill v. Abell:37
It would be conceded, we think, that in case a wife living in
community with her husband but who retained the administration
of her paraphernal property devoted her time and energies as
an overseer or manager of her plantation and produced crops,
the crops would not fall into the community and become subject
33. 228 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ denied, 230 So. 2d 92 (1970).
34. The court stated,
The Law Review Articles found in 25 La. Rev. 95 at pg. 104 and 34 Tul. Law
Rev. 3 discuss the problem of what income represents "fruits," which become
the wife's separate property, and what income represents "earnings" which fall
into the community, under LSA-CC Article 2386, after the affidavit is filed.
The authors suggest the courts should use the ratio of labor to capital as a
criterion for classifying the income as fruits or earnings.
Id. at 163. If one considers such ratios of labor to capital, the analogy is to similar
imputations of income for tax purposes, and supports proration. Spaht and Hargrave,
supra note 2, § 3.5, at 49.
35. "'Thus if the revenue received was the result of substantial capital investment
with relatively little labor, it would be a fruit governed by Article 2386; but if the revenue
represents the return on substantial labor with relatively little capital investment, it would
be earnings governed by Article 2334.' 25 La. Law Rev. at pg. 104." Paxton, 228 So.
2d at 163.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2386 (1870) (as amended by La. Acts 1979, No. 709).
37. 5 La. App. 497 (2d Cir. 1927).
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to the husband's debts.
Then why should crops produced on her property under like
circumstances with the labor of her own hands be subject to a
different rule?38
However, proration would seem to be permitted by the current code
articles and would be the most equitable solution. This is especially true
since adoption of the equal right of both spouses to keep the fruits of
their separate estates separate. The code articles refer simply to "fruits ' 39
at one point and then to property "acquired by the effort, skill, or
industry of either spouse" 4 at another, thus leaving open the question
of whether particular funds are one or the other. Also, one is not
dealing with a determined item, but with fungible sums of money which
are easily apportioned.
An analogy can be made to the Louisiana Civil Code's treatment
of fruits that are produced by the labor of a person who does not own
the soil. The landowner owns the fruits but owes the producer the value
of the labor and the expenses of production.4 1
Another potential analogy is to co-owners of property which pro-
duces fruits. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 798, the co-owners
divide the fruits in proportion to their ownership without regard to
whose labor produced the fruits. If one co-owner does produce the
fruits, the others are entitled to their shares only "after deduction of
the costs of production." Under that language, one would at first argue
that the labor of the co-owner who produced the fruits should be
compensated. But Comment (c) to Article 798 suggests, without stating
authority, "A co-owner does not have the right to claim compensation
for his own labor or services." Immediately afterwards, however, the
comment continues somewhat cryptically, "Nevertheless, he may be en-
titled to such compensation under the law of unjust enrichment." In
any event, the strong implication is that of some equitable apportionment
of the fruits, considering the value of the labor that produced the fruits.
To the extent this recent legislation is relevant to co-owners in
community, it would perhaps reinforce the notion that compensation
for one's labor which enriches the other's patrimony is property under
equitable concepts. The separate estate would be enriched unjustly at
the expense of the community if a spouse used his or her labor to
produce "fruits" rather than "earnings."
The possible injustice in this area is that once a spouse has filed
the declaration to keep separate the fruits of separate property, that
38. Id. at 500.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
41. La. Civ. Code art. 485.
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spouse will then attempt to convert earnings to fruits so as to deprive
the other spouse of what normally would be community income. If this
occurs, the result would be increasing the value of one's separate estate
in general through the uncompensated community labor. In such a case,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2368 might apply and provide compensation
to the other spouse for one-half the increase in value attributed to the
uncompensated labor. However, some doubt exists as to whether Article
2368 covers the situation since the separate estate in general would have
increased in value rather than a separate property asset.
In any event, a pro rata division of the rental income would seem
to be a simpler and more equitable approach since it does not depend
on the enhanced value of the separate property, but on the amount of
income produced.
Pro rata division, disfavored early in matrimonial regimes law, has
been adopted in many areas42 and is the trend in legislative and judicial
developments because it is a fairer and more equitable approach than
an all-or-nothing classification with some possibility of reimbursement.
III. THE CEMETERY PLOT
Keller v. Schilling"3 is a seemingly simple, fact-oriented case, but it
raises some questions about the basic sharing policies involved in com-
munity property. The factual record in the case was thin, no doubt
leading to. the ambiguity in the opinion, but it appears that substantial
community funds were used" to pay for what the court calls a tomb
(apparently in a developed cemetery and including a cemetery plot) in
which "the wife's family members ' 4 were buried.
In a partition of community property following a divorce, the trial
judge concluded that the tomb was worth about $25,000, almost twenty
percent of the value of the community property. He allocated it to the
wife and assigned other property of equal value to the husband. The
court of appeal reversed, concluding that the tomb had no value because
there was no proof of any market in used tombs. The disposition of
the case thus seems to be that the rights to the tomb were allocated to
the wife, but no offsetting property was assigned to the husband.4
42. Including pensions, incorporeal movable rights, and inherited property under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2341.1. See Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, § 3.22, at
75; Hargrave, supra note 23.
43. 593 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
44. The circumstances surrounding the expenditure were not detailed, and in light of
the court's factual conclusions, were not needed.
45. Keller, 593 So. 2d at 927.
46. The court also found that other items, including a doubloon collection and two




Absent other information, the result is intuitively inequitable; a sub-
stantial expenditure of community funds produced a thing that benefitted
the ex-wife and for which the husband received no corresponding com-
pensation.
In analyzing the problem, it ought to be recognized that the rights
attached to the tomb and the rights against the cemetery corporation
are patrimonial rights that are community property if purchased with
community funds. Ownership interests in cemetery plots and rights to
additional burials are established and regulated by statute, including the
provision that "every right of interment and cemetery space shall be
subject to the laws of Louisiana pertaining to community prop-
erty .... ,4" Though the rights of use of such plots and tombs may be
limited because of the nature of cemeteries, 48 they are nonetheless pat-
rimonial rights subject to being included in the mass of community
assets.4 9 If these rights are acquired with community funds, they become
community assets under Louisiana Civil Code article 2338.
In Keller, the court states that the tomb was used for burial of the
wife's family members. Perhaps this use was pursuant to a management
decision made by both spouses. If so, it may be argued that the husband
intended to donate his interest in the tomb to his wife, making it her
separate property. 0 That argument, however, is unsatisfactory because
nothing indicates that the form requirements for such a donation were
met. To the extent the plot and tomb are immovables," an authentic
act of donation would be required. 2 To the extent that incorporeal
rights and obligations with a cemetery corporation are involved, an
authentic act would also be required. 3 In some cases, the laws of
donations and the laws of property were stretched to allow landowners
to "dedicate" land to the public for cemeteries without the formalities
47. La. R.S. 8:803 (1986); see also La. R.S. 8:805-806 (1986).
48. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 498 So.
2d 753 (1986) (Indian burial grounds not subject to occupancy); Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225
So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 227 So. 2d 594 (1969) (landowner could.
charge for burials in dedicated cemetery); Roberts v. Stevens, 389 So. 2d 782 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1980) (landowner could landscape dedicated cemetery area).
49. Rhodes v. Congregation of St. Francis, 476 So. 2d 461 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985)
(title to servitudes or easements for burial); Succession of Rolling, 229 La. 727, 732, 86
So. 2d 687, 688 (1956) (will left to daughter "one half of my double tomb in Metairie
Cemetery, the half in which her father is buried the other half I leave to my four
sons .... "); City of New Orleans v. Christ Church Corp., 228 La. 183, 81 So. 2d 855
(1955) (expropriation of cemetery and reinterment of remains).
50. La. Civ. Code art. 2341.
51. A plot of ground and a permanent structure embedded in or on it would be
immovable under Louisiana Civil Code articles 462 and 463.




of an authentic act.5 4 However, that exception has not been extended
to husbands and wives, and there is no apparent need to do so, especially
since the recent matrimonial regimes revision did not adopt the concept
of informal transmutations of property by donation."
Keller, of course, is not inconsistent with these conclusions that the
plot and tomb are community property. Indeed, it appears that the
court of appeal affirmed the partition which designated the tomb as
the wife's property. The problematic aspect of the case is the appellate
court's reversal of the trial judge on the issue of the value of the tomb.
The court supports its conclusion that the tomb had no value with
the statement that "there is no market for tombs other than new ones." '5 6
But this is beside the point. The court's premise is mistaken because
things have value even if there is no market for them, and such things
are routinely valued in community property partitions. For example, a
lawyer's contingency fee contracts were not salable in a market, but
they were community assets subject to valuation; 7 lease rights may not
be salable, but they are often valued in condemnation proceedings;58
pension rights may not be marketable, but they are routinely valued.19
In the same way, rights associated with additional burials or rights to
control the tomb could be detailed, and the cost of such rights could
be determined. More facts about the nature of the rights involved would
be required to make the determination, but if those facts were not
available to the court of appeal, the appropriate determination was to
remand for consideration of those facts.
Basic policy analysis would also support a more rigorous approach
to the valuation issue, for it is clear that substantial community funds
were expended. They produced an asset, and the basic theory of com-
munity property is that both spouses should share in such acquisitions.
Granted that the value of the gain at the time of the divorce is the
issue rather than how much was spent, but more effort would be wisely
spent on determining what that gain actually was. Even if determining
value is difficult, rough justice is preferable to none. 60
54. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 98, at 209, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d
ed. 1991).
55. See Hargrave, supra note 23, at 672; Noel Joseph Darce, Note, Interspousal
Contracts, 42 La. L. Rev. 727 (1982).
56. Keller v. Schilling, 593 So. 2d 926, 927 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
57. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
58. E.g., Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Hoyt, 215 So. 2d 114 (La. 1968);
Holland v. State, 554 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 125 (1989).
59. See Gerald LeVan, Allocating Deferred Compensation in Louisiana, 38 La. L.
Rev. 35 (1977); Appendix to Justice Dennis' opinion in Hare v. Hodkins, 586 So. 2d
118, 129 (La. 1991).
60. Judge, later Justice, Cole pointed to the necessity of making hard valuations:
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IV. Renewal Premium Commissions
In Williams v. Williams,6' the third circuit court of appeal first
concluded that an ex-husband's renewal commissions attributed to in-
surance policies sold during the community but paid after termination
were not to be shared with his ex-wife. Then it determined that even
if the funds were produced in part from a community right, the former
wife's interest was so speculative that it had no value at all. The case
is questionable on both counts. It conflicts with the decision of the first
circuit in Michel v. Michel,62 with the approach of the fourth circuit in
Boyle v. Boyle,63 and with dictum from the second circuit in Tobin v.
Tobin.6 The court did concede that the former husband had a right to
a commission upon the renewal of insurance policies and that this right
was acquired as a result of labor performed during the community. It
should follow that this right was a community asset that should be
portioned, or if not, that remained owned in indivision by the parties.
Instead, the court concluded that the right was not a community asset,
apparently on the basis that it was not a vested right. The court said,
"However, the services performed by Ronnie during the existence of
the community created no vested right in him, i.e., property interest
acquired during the community, in the renewal premiums because of
their conditional nature. 65
The Louisiana Civil Code, however, does not require "vesting"
before a right can be a patrimonial asset subject to the community
"In determining the amount of enhancement, any reasonable method may be used, even,
in difficult cases, to the extent of averaging the conflicting and exaggerated estimates of
witnesses." Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829, 834 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (quoting
Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096, 1101 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981)). Also see Babin
v. Nolan, in which, after three trips to the supreme court, "the court accepted the
testimony of all witnesses 'notwithstanding their inconsistencies and exaggerations' and
simply used the average of all values given." Deliberto, 400 So. 2d at 1100 (quoting
Babin v. Nolan, 10 Rob. 373, 382 (La. 1845)). For a primer on valuation, see the
bibliography in the appendix to Justice Dennis' opinion in Hare v. Hodkins, 586 So. 2d
118, 129 (La. 1991).
61. 590 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
62. 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). Accord, In re Marriage of Skaden,
566 P.2d 249 (Ca. 1977) (termination benefits from State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. held
community).
63. 459 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 651 (1985)
("The trial court awarded Rita one-half of the renewal on policies written as of November
13, 1978, although the funds would not be collected until a future time. Due v. Due,
342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977)"). Id. at 736.
64. 323 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), writ denied, 325 So. 2d 613 (1976).
The court referred in passing to the fact that the surviving widow of an insurance agent
"receives $450 to $500 per month from renewal premiums on policies her husband sold
before his death." Id. at 898. It apparently was willing to consider this as a patrimonial
asset that had been inherited by the surviving spouse.
65. Williams v. Williams, 590 So. 2d 649, 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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regime. The pension cases disregarded vesting in holding that conditional
rights can be community assets. 6
In the course of this case development, the courts rejected a
number of arguments that would have limited the scope of assets
to be shared. Rejected were the view[s] that only tangible assets
could be shared; that only "vested" as opposed to conditional
rights could be included; that an asset had to be capable of
joint management to be included; that only salable or transfer-
able assets were to be shared; and that the asset had to have
an ascertainable value at the time of separation or divorce.6 7
Indeed, in Williams, the former husband continued his relationship
with the insurance company and collected more than $100,000 in renewal
premiums over a five year period; the right was certainly a substantial
and valuable one even if not vested. It was one that did in fact mature
into a determined sum of money. Even if not vested at the time of
termination in 1984, it had produced specific sums at the time of the
partition in 1989.
The court tried to distinguish Due by stating that a contingent fee
contract, "although aleatory and revocable at the will of the client or
by death, creates a vested interest in the attorney to recover for the
services performed prior to termination of the contract. ' 68 But nowhere
in the Due opinion does one find a statement that the attorney's rights
were "vested" or had to be "vested" to be a community asset. It was
the trial judge who concluded that contingent fee contracts were not
community assets "because no interest is vested in the attorney until
the contract is completed by successful disposition of the case." ' 69 He
was reversed. To the contrary, Justice Albert Tate wrote that vesting
was irrelevant and that a conditional right could be a patrimonial asset:
"Accordingly, we find no merit to the defendant's argument that, some-
how by reason of technical characterization, no economic value should
be attributed to an attorney's interest in a contingent fee contract until
the successful prosecution of claim entitles him to actual compensation
for his services.' '70
An alternative rationale in Williams emphasized testimony by in-
surance company officials that "it was impossible to translate the gross
number of policies renewed into an exact money figure received as
66. See LeVan, supra note 59; Larsen v. Larsen, 583 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991).
67. Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 2, § 2.3, at 27.
68. Williams, 590 So. 2d at 651 (emphasis added).
69. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 163 (La. 1977).
70. Id. at 165.
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renewal premiums because of the varying nature of some premiums.1 71
That conclusion is hard to fathom since the company was at least able
to determine the renewal premiums it owed the agent for each policy
that was renewed.
More to the point, the court stated that it was impossible to de-
termine the proportion of the renewal premium commissions attributable
to services performed during the community's existence and to services
performed after termination to keep the policies in force. That obser-
vation is no doubt accurate, but it does not require allocating all the
money to the ex-husband. The right to renewal premiums was a com-
munity asset. If it was not divided at the time of termination of the
community, the spouses remained co-owners of equal parts of that right.
Co-owners under Louisiana Civil Code article 798 each own a share of
the fruits and products of the thing held in indivision in proportion to
their ownership. If the ex-husband co-owner expended funds to produce
the fruits, he would be entitled to his costs of production under Article
798. While Comment (c) to Article 798 suggests he would not be entitled
to compensation for his labor or services, it also states he could be
entitled to compensation under the law of unjust enrichment. If he
claimed such compensation, he would have the burden of proving the
amount of his expenses or the value of his services to be able to collect
those funds. The result in Williams, if the proof is not available to
determine the value of those expenses or services, should be that the
co-owners share equally in the renewal commissions.
Even if one somehow concludes that the rules of co-ownership are
inapplicable because the co-owners are spouses, the equitable approach
would be to pro-rate the income between the community right and the
now-separate labor contributed by the husband to keeping the policies
in force. Since it is the husband who would be urging that he produced
the income, the burden should be on him to establish that labor and
its contribution.
In any event, the problem the court perceived is a factual one, and
its inability to make a perfect division should not be the basis to totally
exclude one of the owners of a right from enjoying its benefits. Equity
would require some approximate division, as the third circuit itself
recognized in the celebrated case of Placide v. Placide.72 There, the
court apportioned the pain and suffering award attributable to surgery
and sexual dysfunction between the short period of the marriage (com-
munity) and the rest of the ex-husband's life (separate). 71
71. Williams, 590 So. 2d at 652.
72. 408 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
73. Id.
It is clear that at least some part of the general damages awarded to appellant
19931
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
V. DONATIONS
In Ackel v. Ackel, 74 the husband incorporated the community drug-
store business and then had the corporation issue all of the stock to
one son. In a dispute over the stock after his death, the court found
the stock issuance was an attempt to donate community property that
lacked the concurrence of both spouses. "Whatever George Ackel, Sr.'s
intent, he was without the legal right to dispose of the corporation in
favor of one child, to the detriment of the other heir. He could not
donate the whole of a community property asset without consent of his
wife." 75
The same result should follow whether the attempt was to donate
the whole of the community property or not. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2349 requires concurrence of both spouses to donate any com-
munity property to a third person. The only exception is that one spouse
acting alone can only make "a usual or customary gift' of a value
commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of
the donation." It should also follow that even if the formalities for
transfer of stock were met, the donee son would not have acquired
ownership of the stock as against the mother's community interest. Only
a "bona fide purchaser for value" is protected by transfer formalities,
and a donee is not a purchaser for value.76
was intended to compensate him for his pain and suffering resulting from the
injury to his penis and back and from the four surgeries. It is equally clear,
however, that the greater part of the award for general damages was intended
to compensate the appellant for the loss of normal sexual function which he
will suffer for the remainder of his life. Although there was evidence at trial
that the appellant could perform sexual intercourse as often after the accident
as he did before, there was also evidence that the use of the prosthesis was a
source of embarrassment and inconvenience to the appellant and that intercourse
after the implant was not very satisfactory. Accordingly, on an equitable basis,
we find that the general damages of $207,713.71 compensates the appellant for
$20,000 of pre-dissolution losses and $187,713.71 of post-dissolution losses. That
portion which compensates for post-dissolution losses falls into the separate
estate of the husband, and that portion for pre-dissolution losses falls into the
community.
Id. at 335-36.
74. 595 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 742-43.
76. La. R.S. 10:8-302 (1983).
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